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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON SOME OF 
SEVERAL MULTIPLE CLAIMS UNDER RuLE 54 (b)-Plaintiff filed a complaint 
in a federal district court alleging in six counts that defendant was en-
gaged in unfair competition against business ventures carried on by the 
plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The 
court ordered two counts to be stricken, found that there was no just reason 
for delaying the final determination of the issues raised by these counts, 
and directed that judgment be entered thereon against the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff appealed and the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal on the 
ground that the order and judgment appealed from was not a final or 
appealable order under the requirements of section 1291, title 28, U.S.C. 
284 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
(1952). Held, motion to dismiss denied. The district court's decision 
was a "final decision" within the meaning of section 1291. Mackey v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., (7th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 295. 
Prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the order in the principal 
case would not have been appealable since it did not dispose of all of the 
claims involved.1 In the various multiple-claim proceedings so liberally 
permitted by the federal rules,2 the original rule 54 (b) gave the district 
courts a discretionary power to enter final judgment on one or more 
claims in the action.3 Except where the district court expressly made its 
order subject to further consideration, this resulted in uncertainty as to 
what orders were actually final for appellate purposes. This uncertainty 
required an unsuccessful litigant either to undergo an expensive appeal 
which might be dismissed for lack of finality, or risk losing his right to 
appeal if the order was ultimately determined to have been final.4 In 
1948, rule 54 (b) was amended in order to reduce the number of appeals 
from multiple-claim suits and to protect litigants from inadvertently losing 
their right to appeal.5 The trial judge was given the discretion to permit 
appeals where hardship would otherwise result.6 Where the trial court 
makes the "determination" and "direction" specified in rule 54 (b), the 
question arises whether such action, of itself, renders the judgment appeal-
able even though it might not have been so prior to the rule. The ap-
pellate courts which have considered this question have reached opposite 
conclusions. Some have said that the amended rule merely adds another 
formal prerequisite for finality, i.e., the "determination" and "direction" 
by the lower court, and that the appellate court still has to determine its 
own jurisdiction on appeal.7 Other courts have decided that once the 
litigant has secured the trial judge's determination, he is assured of having 
his appeal heard on the merits.8 Under either view, the danger of one's 
1 Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 40 S.Ct. 347 (1920); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 
229, 65 S.Ct. 631 (1945). 
3 Rules 13, 14, 18, 20, 24, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
3 Rule 54 (b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1938); Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 
283, 62 S.Ct. 1085 (1942). 
4 See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 70 S.Ct. 322 (1950); 47 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 233 (1948). 
5 "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action .•• the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims 
·only upon an express determination that there is not just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment .. · .. " Rule 54(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 
u.s.c. (1952). 
6 Notes of Advisory Committee on Amendments to Rules, following rule 54b, 28 U.S.C. 
(1946); MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 518 (1949). 
7 Flegenheimer v. General Mills, (2d Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 237, noted in 51 MICH. L. 
REv. 300 (1952); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 802. Cf. Creel v. 
Creel, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 449. 
s Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., (2d Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 169; Lopinsky v. Hertz 
Drive-Ur-Self Systems, Inc., (2d Cir. 1951) 194 F. (2d) 422; Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 
(3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 267; Boston Medical Supply Corp. v. Lea & Febiger, (1st Cir. 
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losing his right to appeal is largely eliminated since an order disposing of 
less than all counts is appealable only if the requirements of the rule are 
met.9 However, only under the latter interpretation will the number of 
appeals be limited. The courts adopting the former approach argue that 
to allow appeals which would not have been possible before the amended 
rule would materially alter appellate jurisdiction. They contend that 
changing the established meaning of "final decision" goes beyond the 
scope of the Supreme Court's rule making power.10 If by "final decision" 
it is meant that a court must end its consideration · of the judicial unit 
with which it is dealing,11 then the district judge is given the power to 
change the meaning of section 1291 by attributing finality to claims with-
out considering whether the entire litigation has been disposed of. But in 
view of the great confusion surrounding the meaning of the term "final 
decision"12 and the need for revision of the finality concept brought about 
by the expanded joinder provisions of the federal rules,13 the latter view 
appears to be more practical. Furthermore, the courts have had no dif-
ficulty in upholding a number of other federal rules which also have a 
direct effect on appellate jurisdiction.14 A conclusive determination by the 
trial court is the best way to prevent unnecessary litigation, and it also 
reflects the intent of the framers of the amended rule.15 
Lawrence N. Ravick, S.Ed. 
1952) 195 F. (2d) 853; Francis v. Crafts, (1st Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 809. Cf. Eversharp, Inc., 
v. Pal Blade Co., (2d Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 779. 
9Winsor v. Daumit, (7th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 475; Republic of China v. American 
Express Co., (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 334; Dyer v. MacDougall, (2d Cir. 1952) 201 F. 
(2d) 265. 
10 28 U.S.C. (1952) §2072; United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 767 (1941). 
11 For a discussion of the meaning of a "final decision," see 51 MICH. L. REv. 300 (1952). 
12 Crick, "The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal," 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932); 62 
YALE L.J. 263 at 269 (1953). 
13 See 41 MICH. L. R.Ev. 535 (1942). 
14 Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Service Systems, Inc., note 8 supra, at 428; Ray v. 
Morris, (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 498. 
15 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 228 (1953). 
